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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 05-5025
___________
DAVID L. CHAPMAN,
Appellant
v.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS;
JOHN DOES 1-10 (FICTITIOUS); CORPORATION A-Z;
SENIOR MANAGER ELLEN GORIA;
DIRECTOR LISA SNYDER
___________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-03692)
District Judge: The Honorable William H. Walls
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 11, 2007
Before: SMITH, NYGAARD, and HANSEN,* Circuit Judges.

*Honorable David R. Hansen, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting by designation.

(Filed April 19, 2007)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
David L. Chapman appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment against
him on his claim that his employer failed to promote him, and eventually terminated him,
because of his race. We will affirm.
I.
Because we write for the benefit of the parties, we recite only those facts necessary
to our analysis. Chapman, an African-American male, was a technical manager for the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) for over three years. While
at AICPA, he was the only African-American in the Professional Ethics Division, and his
supervisor was a white female. During his second year with AICPA, he was placed in the
organization’s System to Accept Responsibility for Job Performance (STAR) program.
After 14 months in the program, Chapman was terminated. He was replaced by a Latino
female.
Chapman filed suit against AICPA in the Superior Court of New Jersey, alleging
(1) gender discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981; (2) race discrimination under §1981;
(3) gender discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD);
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(4) race discrimination under the NJLAD; and (5) wrongful discharge. AICPA removed
the action to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Court
dismissed counts one and five, and granted summary judgment in favor of AICPA on the
remaining counts. Chapman filed a timely appeal with respect to counts two and four.
II.
On appeal, Chapman claims that AICPA failed to promote him and then
terminated him because of his race. Racial discrimination claims under the NJLAD and
§1981 are analyzed under the framework set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie claim.
Establishment of a prima facie claim raises an inference of discrimination, which the
defendant may rebut by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for the
adverse employment action. If the defendant successfully rebuts the inference of
discrimination, the plaintiff may still defeat a motion for summary judgment by pointing
to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a fact-finder could reasonably
either (1) disbelieve the employer’s proffered justification; or (2) believe that an invidious
discriminatory motive was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the
employer’s action. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).
AICPA contends that Chapman failed to establish a prima facie discrimination
claim because he was not qualified for his position. We disagree. Chapman worked as a
technical manager for nearly two years before being placed in the STAR program. This
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fact was sufficient to establish that he met his position’s objective qualifications. See
Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729 (3d Cir. 1995).
Nevertheless, AICPA presented more than sufficient evidence to show that
Chapman was not promoted, and was ultimately terminated, because he consistently
failed to meet performance requirements. To avoid summary judgment, Chapman was
therefore required to demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions” in AICPA’s explanation that a reasonable fact-finder
could find that unlawful discrimination was the real reason behind AICPA’s decisions.
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. He did not present any evidence that white employees with
similar performance records were either promoted or retained by AICPA. Nor did he
present any other evidence of racial bias or hostility at AICPA. Like the District Court,
we conclude that Chapman failed to demonstrate that AICPA’s proffered justification was
merely pretextual and that AICPA discriminated against him because of his race.

III.
We conclude that Chapman failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome
summary judgment against his claims of racial discrimination under the NJLAD and 42
U.S.C. §1981. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
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